

MAJOR MILITARY INTELLIGENCE PROBLEMS

12/73, as part
of PM exercise

1. There is a sharp imbalance between collection and production.
2. Production resources and funding must be increased.
3. The rules of production and collection compartmentation need review.
4. There are inadequate numbers of analysts.
5. The time of the limited number of analysts is being misused.
6. A significant number of analysts lack adequate training to conduct sophisticated analysis.
7. Too much time is spent on conducting political analysis -- too little on military intelligence analysis per se.
8. Cross-training of production analysts in collection disciplines (and vice versa) is inadequate.
9. Management of the time and productivity of analysts is inadequate.
10. Quality and experience levels of middle managers (through O-6, GS-15) is not conducive to quality production.
11. Upper levels of management are not providing sufficient direction and control over their production operations.

DIA Declassification/Release Instructions on File

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MAJOR MILITARY INTELLIGENCE PROBLEMS

I. Collection vs. Production

a. The capability of the collection and processing systems outstrip the ability of the production community to analyze and produce finished intelligence.

b. This imbalance is so great that there should be a thorough review of production and collection funding with a view to markedly increasing the former even if it means decreasing the budget of the latter.

c. Collectors can help resolve the imbalance problem if they are willing to depart from some of the more time-honored and rigid views of compartmentation of collection and production functions. Some examples:

(1) NSA should produce finished intelligence providing their judgments as to the significance of intelligence derived exclusively from their sources.

(2) NPIC should provide finished intelligence products illustrating the significance of intelligence derived exclusively from their sources.

(3) Clandestine HUMINT reporting should highlight the message they are trying to transmit by (a) providing the production analyst with better identification of both source and information reliability and (b) provide integrated analysis of the most significant HUMINT reports.

II. Production Problems

a. There are inadequate numbers of analysts.

Collection and processing capabilities outstrip the ability of production assets to analyze and produce finished intelligence.

b. The time of the limited number of analysts is being misused.

(1) Extremely disproportionate time and talent expended on daily, ten minute CJCS briefing.

(2) Time of professionals improperly used in preparing creation sheets to feed the automated files (up to three hours a day for professionals assigned to Arlington Hall).

(3) Most talented current intelligence analysts used to fulfill the requirements for "dog and pony shows" and not upon the less glamorous and painstaking analytical studies.

c. A significant number of analysts lack adequate training to conduct sophisticated analysis:

Inability to analyze complex problems such as:

(a) how to assess the combat effectiveness of foreign military forces when HUMINT sources are limited.

(b) is it possible to establish through SIGINT/PHOTINT an indicator list which would permit me to discern the differences between Arab and Israeli exercises and intentions to initiate hostilities?

(c) how can we analyze the Arabs' capability to employ the sophisticated weapons systems provided by the Soviets?

d. Too much time is spent on conducting political analysis -- too little on military intelligence analysis per se.

(1) If military intelligence analysts had substantially ignored the political scene and concentrated upon the military indicators, there would have been a much greater likelihood that the community would have been forced to make a reappraisal of conventional Arab-Israeli wisdom.

(2) Little effort is spent by DIA tasking INR and CIA to provide them with the types of intelligence which by charter these agencies are charged with producing.

e. Cross-training of production analysts in collection disciplines (and vice versa) is inadequate.

(1) Too much of a "them" (the dull collection types) and "us" (the smart production types) attitude.

(2) Cross-training should include a full tour of duty in a collection discipline.

f. Management of the time and productivity of analysts is inadequate.

(1) Management often seems to be almost entirely lacking

(2) All production requests are honored regardless of source of request or need to know

g. Quality and experience levels of middle managers (through O-6, GS-15) is not conducive to quality production.

(1) Too many managers are in the "passed-over" and "twilight tour" category.

(2) Many lack sufficient military operational experience so that they can meaningfully direct and lead the work of their production analysts.

h. Upper levels of management are remiss in providing sufficient direction and control over their production operations, particularly in the following matters:

(1) failure to create adequate mechanisms to challenge whatever is the conventional wisdom on any subject at any moment in time.

(2) failure to control and validate production priorities.

(3) failure to demand the conduct of independent military intelligence analysis, separate and distinct from political analysis.

(4) failure to require the use of advanced analytical methodologies in intelligence production.